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What Experience Teaches1 
 
© DAVID LEWIS 1988 
 
Experience the best teacher 
 
They say that experience is the best teacher, and the classroom is no substitute for 
Real Life. There's truth to this. If you want to know what some new and different 
experience is like, you can learn it by going out and really having that experience. 
You can’t learn it by being told about the experience, however thorough your 
lessons may be. 
 Does this prove much of anything about the metaphysics of mind and the limits 
of science? I think not. 
 
 Example: Skunks and Vegemite. I have smelled skunks, so I know what it's like to 
smell skunks. But skunks live only in some parts of the world, so you may never 
have smelled a skunk. If you haven’t smelled a skunk, then you don’t know what it's 
like. You never will, unless someday you smell a skunk for yourself. On the other 
hand, you may have tasted Vegemite, that famous Australian substance; and I never 
have. So you may know what it's like to taste Vegemite. I don't, and unless l taste 
Vegemite (what, and spoil a good example!), I never will. It won’t help at all to take 
lessons on the chemical composition of skunk scent or Vegemite, the physiology of 
the nostrils or the taste-buds, and the neurophysiology of the sensory nerves and the 
brain. 
 
 Example: The Captive Scientist.2 Mary, a brilliant scientist, has lived from birth in a 
cell where everything is black or white. (Even she herself is painted all over.) She 
views the world on black-and-white television. By television she reads books, she 
joins in discussion, she watches the results of experiments done under her direction. 
In this way she becomes the world’s leading expert on color and color vision and the 
brain states produced by exposure to colors. But she doesn’t know what it’s like to 
see color. And she never will, unless she escapes from her cell. 
 
 Example: The Bat?3 The bat is an alien creature, with a sonar sense quite unlike any 
sense of ours. We can never have the experiences of a bat; because we could not 
become bat-like enough to have those experiences and still be ourselves. We will 
never know what it’s like to be a bat. Not even if we come to know all the facts there 
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are about the bat’s behavior and behavioral dispositions, about the bat’s physical 
structure and processes, about the bat’s functional organization. Not even if we 
come to know all the same sort of physical facts about all the other bats, or about 
other creatures, or about ourselves, Not even if we come to possess all physical facts 
whatever. Not even if we become able to recognize all the mathematical and logical 
implications of all these facts, no matter how complicated and how far beyond the 
reach of finite deduction. 
 
 Experience is the best teacher, in this sense: having an experience is the best way 
or perhaps the only way, of coming to know what that experience is like. No amount 
of scientific information about the stimuli that produce that experience and the 
process that goes on in you when you have that experience will enable you to know 
what it’s like to have the experience. 
 
. . .but not necessarily 
 
Having an experience is surely one good way, and surely the only practical way, of 
coming to know what that experience is like. Can we say, flatly, that it is the only 
possible way? Probably not. There is a change that takes place in you when you have 
the experience and thereby come to know what it’s like. Perhaps the exact same 
change could in principle be produced in you by precise neurosurgery, very far 
beyond the limits of present-day technique. Or it could possibly be produced in you 
by magic. If we ignore the laws of nature, which are after all contingent, then there is 
no necessary connection between cause and effect: anything could cause anything. 
For instance, the casting of a spell could do to you exactly what your first smell of 
skunk would do. We might quibble about whether a state produced in this artificial 
fashion would deserve the name “knowing what it’s like to smell a skunk,” but we 
can imagine that so far as what goes on within you is concerned, it would differ not 
at all.4 
 Just as we can imagine that a spell might produce the same change as a smell, so 
likewise we can imagine that science lessons might cause that same change. Even 
that is possible, in the broadest sense of the word. If we ignored all we know about 
how the world really works, we could not say what might happen to someone if he 
were taught about the chemistry of scent and the physiology of the nose. There 
might have been a causal mechanism that transforms science lessons into whatever it 
is that experience gives us. But there isn’t. It is not an absolutely necessary truth that 
experience is the best teacher about what a new experience is like. It’s a contingent 
truth. But we have good reason to think it’s true. 
 We have good reason to think that something of this kind is true, anyway, but less 
reason to be sure exactly what. Maybe some way of giving the lessons that hasn’t yet 
been invented, and some way of taking them in that hasn’t yet been practiced, could 
give us a big surprise. Consider sight-reading: a trained musician can read the score 
and know what it would be like to hear the music. If I’d never heard that some 
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people can sight-read, I would never have thought it humanly possible. Of course 
the moral is that new music isn’t altogether new – the big new experience is a 
rearrangement of lots of little old experiences. It just might turn out the same for 
new smells and tastes vis-à-vis old ones; or even for color vision vis-à-vis black and 
white;5 or even for sonar sense experience vis-à-vis the sort we enjoy. The thing we 
can say with some confidence is that we have no faculty for knowing on the basis of 
mere science lessons what some new enough experience would be like. But how new 
is “new enough”? – There, we just might be in for surprises. 
 
Three ways to miss the point 
 
The First Way. A literalist might see the phrase “know what it’s like” and take that to 
mean: “know what it resembles.” Then he might ask: what’s so hard about that? 
Why can’t you just be told which experiences resemble one another? You needn’t 
have had the experiences – all you need, to be taught your lessons, is some way of 
referring to them. You could be told: the smell of skunk somewhat resembles the 
smell of burning rubber. I have been told: the taste of Vegemite somewhat resembles 
that of Marmite. Black-and-white Mary might know more than most of us about the 
resemblances among color-experiences. She might know which ones are 
spontaneously called “similar” by subjects who have them; which gradual changes 
from one to another tend to escape notice; which ones get conflated with which in 
memory; which ones involve roughly the same neurons firing in similar rhythms; 
and so forth. We could even know what the bat’s sonar experiences resemble just by 
knowing that they do not at all resemble any experiences of humans, but do 
resemble – as it might be - certain experiences that occur in certain fish. This misses 
the point. Pace the literalist, “know what it’s like” does not mean “know what it 
resembles.” The most that’s true is that knowing what it resembles may help you to 
know what it’s like. If you are taught that experience A resembles B and C closely, D 
less, E not at all, that will help you know what A is like – if you know already what B 
and C and D and E are like. Otherwise, it helps you not at all. I don’t know any 
better what it’s like to taste Vegemite when I’m told that it tastes like Marmite, 
because I don’t know what Marmite tastes like either. (Nor do I know any better 
what Marmite tastes like for being told it tastes like Vegemite.) Maybe Mary knows 
enough to triangulate each color experience exactly in a network of resemblances, or 
in many networks of resemblance in different respects, while never knowing what 
any node of any network is like. Maybe we could do the same for bat experiences. 
But no amount of information about resemblances, just by itself, does anything to 
help us know what an experience is like. 
 
 The Second Way. In so far as I don’t know what it would be like to drive a steam 
locomotive fast on a cold, stormy night, part of my problem is just that I don’t know 
what experiences I would have. The firebox puts out a lot of heat, especially when 
the fireman opens the door to throw on more coal; on the other hand, the cab is 
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drafty and gives poor protection from the weather. Would I be too hot or too cold? 
Or both by turns? Or would it be chilled face and scorched legs? If I knew the 
answers to such questions, I’d know much better what it would be like to drive the 
locomotive. So maybe “know what it’s like” just means “know what experiences one 
has.” Then again: what’s the problem? Why can’t you just be told what experiences 
you would have if, say, you tasted Vegemite? Again, you needn’t have had the 
experiences – all you need, to be taught your lessons, is some way of referring to 
them. We have ways to refer to experiences we haven’t had. We can refer to them in 
terms of their causes: the experience one has upon tasting Vegemite, the experience 
one has upon tasting a substance of such-and-such chemical composition. Or we can 
refer to them in terms of their effects: the experience that just caused Fred to say 
“Yeeuch!” Or we can refer to them in terms of the physical states of the nervous 
system that mediate between those causes and effects: the experience one has when 
one’s nerves are firing in such- and-such pattern. (According to some materialists, I 
myself for one, this means the experience which is identical with such-and-such 
firing pattern. According to other materialists it means the experience which is 
realized by such-and-such firing pattern. According to many dualists, it means the 
experience which is merely the lawful companion of such-and-such firing pattern. 
But whichever it is, we get a way of referring to the experience.) Black-and-white 
Mary is in a position to refer to color-experiences in all these ways. Therefore you 
should have no problem in telling her exactly what experiences one has upon seeing 
the colors. Or rather, your only problem is that you’d be telling her what she knows 
very well already! In general, to know what is the X is to know that the X is the Y, 
where it’s not too obvious that the X is the Y. (Just knowing that the X is the X won’t 
do, of course, because it is too obvious.) If Mary knows that the experience of seeing 
green is the experience associated with such-and-such pattern of nerve firings, then 
she knows the right sort of unobvious identity. So she knows what experience one 
has upon seeing green. 
 (Sometimes it’s suggested that you need a “rigid designator”: you know what is 
the X by knowing that the X is the Y only if “the Y” is a term whose referent does not 
depend on any contingent matter of fact. In the first place, this suggestion is false. 
You can know who is the man on the balcony by knowing that the man on the 
balcony is the Prime Minister even if neither “the Prime Minister” nor any other 
phrase available to you rigidly designates the man who is, in fact, the Prime 
Minister. In the second place, according to one version of Materialism (the one I 
accept) a description of the form “the state of having nerves firing in such-and- such 
a pattern” is a rigid designator, and what it designates is in fact an experience; and 
according to another version of Materialism, a description of the form “having some 
or other state which occupies so-and-so functional role” is a rigid designator of an 
experience. So even if the false suggestion were granted, still it hasn’t been shown, 
without begging the question against Materialism, that Mary could not know what 
experience one has upon seeing red.) 
 Since Mary does know what experiences she would have if she saw the colors, but 
she doesn’t know what it would be like to see the colors, we’d better conclude that 
“know what it’s like” does not after all mean “know what experiences one has.” The 
locomotive example was misleading. Yes, by learning what experiences the driver 
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would have, I can know what driving the locomotive would be like; but only 
because I already know what those experiences are like. (It matters that I know what 
they‘re like under the appropriate descriptions – as it might be, the description 
“chilled face and scorched legs.” This is something we’ll return to later.) Mary may 
know as well as I do that when the driver leans out into the storm to watch the 
signals, he will have the experience of seeing sometimes green lights and sometimes 
red. She knows better than I what experiences he has when signals come into view. 
She can give many more unobviously equivalent descriptions of those experiences 
than I can. But knowing what color-experiences the driver has won‘t help Mary to 
know what his job is like. It will help me. 
 
 The Third Way. Until Mary sees green, here is one thing she will never know: she 
will never know that she is seeing green. The reason why is just that until she sees 
green, it will never be true that she is seeing green. Some knowledge is irreducibly 
egocentric, or de se.6 It is not just knowledge about what goes on in the world; it is 
knowledge of who and when in the world one is. Knowledge of what goes on in the 
world will be true alike for all who live in that world;. whereas egocentric 
knowledge may be true for one and false for another, or true for one at one time and 
false for the same one at another time. Maybe Mary knows in advance, as she plots 
her escape, that 9 a.m. on the 13th of May, 1997, is the moment when someone 
previously confined in a black-and-white cell sees color for the first time. But until 
that moment comes, she will never know that she herself is then seeing color – 
because she isn’t. What isn’t true isn’t knowledge. This goes as much for egocentric 
knowledge as for the rest. So only those of whom an egocentric proposition is true 
can know it, and only at times when it is true of them can they know it. That one is 
then seeing color is an egocentric proposition. So we’ve found a proposition which 
Mary can never know until she sees color – which, as it happens, is the very moment 
when she will first know what it’s like to see color! Have we discovered the reason 
why experience is the best teacher? And not contingently after all, but as a necessary 
consequence of the logic of egocentric knowledge? 
 No; we have two separate phenomena here, and only some bewitchment about 
the “first-person perspective” could make us miss the difference. In the first place, 
Mary will probably go on knowing what it’s like to see green after she stops 
knowing the egocentric proposition that she’s then seeing green. Since what isn’t 
true isn’t known she must stop knowing that proposition the moment she stops 
seeing green. (Does that only mean that we should have taken a different egocentric 
proposition: that one has seen green? No; for in that case Mary could go on knowing 
the proposition even after she forgets what it’s like to see green, as might happen if 
she were soon recaptured.) In the second place, Mary might come to know what it’s 
like to see green even if she didn’t know the egocentric proposition. She might not 
have known in advance that her escape route would take her across a green 
meadow, and it might take her a little while to recognize grass by its shape. So at 
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first she might know only that she was seeing some colors or other, and thereby 
finding out what some color-experiences or other were like, without being able to 
put a name either to the colors or to the experiences. She would then know what it 
was like to see green, though not under that description, indeed not under any 
description more useful than “the color-experience I’m having now"; but she would 
not know the egocentric proposition that she is then seeing green, since she wouldn’t 
know which color she was seeing. In the third place, the gaining of egocentric 
knowledge may have prerequisites that have nothing to do with experience. Just as 
Mary can’t know she’s seeing green until she does see green, she can’t know she’s 
turning 50 until she does turn 50. But – I hope! – turning 50 does not involve some 
special experience. In short, though indeed one can gain egocentric knowledge that 
one is in some situation only when one is in it, that is not the same as finding out 
what an experience is like only when one has that experience. 
 We’ve just rejected two suggestions that don’t work separately, and we may note 
that they don’t work any better when put together. One knows what is the X by 
knowing that the X is the Y, where the identity is not too obvious; and “the Y” might 
be an egocentric description. So knowledge that the X is the Y might be irreducibly 
egocentric knowledge, therefore knowledge that cannot be had until it is true of one 
that the X is the Y. So one way of knowing what is the X will remain unavailable 
until it comes true of one that the X is the Y. One way that I could gain an unobvious 
identity concerning the taste of Vegemite would be for it to come true that the taste 
of Vegemite was the taste I was having at that very moment – and that would come 
true at the very moment I tasted Vegemite and found out what it was like! Is this 
why experience is the best teacher? – No; cases of gaining an unobvious egocentric 
identity are a dime a dozen, and most of them do not result in finding out what an 
experience is like. Suppose I plan ahead that I will finally break down and taste 
Vegemite next Thursday noon. Then on Wednesday noon, if I watch the clock, I first 
gain the unobvious egocentric knowledge that the taste of Vegemite is the taste I 
shall be having in exactly 24 hours, and thereby I have a new way of knowing what 
is the taste of Vegemite. But on Wednesday noon I don’t yet know what it’s like. 
Another example: from time to time I find myself next to a Vegemite-taster. On those 
occasions, and only those, I know what is the taste of Vegemite by knowing that it is 
the taste being had by the person next to me. But on no such occasion has it ever yet 
happened that I knew what it was like to taste Vegemite. 
 
The Hypothesis of Phenomenal Information 
 
No amount of the physical information that black-and-white Mary gathers could 
help her know what it was like to see colors; no amount of the physical information 
that we might gather about bats could help us know what it’s like to have their 
experiences; and likewise in other cases. There is a natural and tempting explanation 
of why physical information does not help. That is the hypothesis that besides 
physical information there is an irreducibly different kind of information to be had: 
phenomenal information. The two are independent. Two possible cases might be 
exactly alike physically, yet differ phenomenally. When we get physical information 
we narrow down the physical possibilities, and perhaps we narrow them down all 
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the way to one, but we leave open a range of phenomenal possibilities. When we 
have an experience, on the other hand, we acquire phenomenal information; 
possibilities previously open are eliminated; and that is what it is to learn what the 
experience is like.  
 (Analogy. Suppose the question concerned the location of a point within a certain 
region of the x-y plane. We might be told that its x-coordinate lies in certain 
intervals, and outside certain others. We might even get enough of this information 
to fix the x-coordinate exactly. But no amount of x-information would tell us 
anything about the y-coordinate; any amount of x-information leaves open all the y-
possibilities. But when at last we make a y-measurement, we acquire a new kind of 
information; possibilities previously open are eliminated; and that is how we learn 
where the point is in the y-direction.) 
 What might the subject matter of phenomenal information be? If the Hypothesis 
of Phenomenal Information is true, then you have an easy answer: it is information 
about experience. More specifically, it is information about a certain part or aspect or 
feature of experience. But if the Hypothesis is false, then there is still experience 
(complete with all its parts and aspects and features) and yet no information about 
experience is phenomenal information. So it cannot be said in a neutral way, without 
presupposing the Hypothesis, that information about experience is phenomenal 
information. For if the Hypothesis is false and Materialism is true, it may be that all 
the information there is about experience is physical information, and can very well 
be presented in lessons for the inexperienced. 
 It makes no difference to put some fashionable new phrase in place of 
“experience.” If instead of “experience” you say “raw feel” (or just “feeling”), or 
“way it feels,” or “what it’s like,” then I submit that you mean nothing different. Is 
there anything it’s like to be this robot? Does this robot have experiences? – I can tell 
no difference between the new question and the old. Does sunburn feel the same 
way to you that it does to me? Do we have the same raw feel? Do we have the same 
experience when sunburned? – Again, same question. “Know the feeling,” “know 
what it’s like” – interchangeable. (Except that the former may hint at an alternative 
to the Hypothesis of Phenomenal Information.) So if the friend of phenomenal 
information says that its subject matter is raw feels, or ways to feel, or what it’s like, 
then I respond just as I do if he says that the subject matter is experience. Maybe so, 
if the Hypothesis of Phenomenal Information is true; but if the Hypothesis is false 
and Materialism is true, nevertheless there is still information about raw feels, ways 
to feel or what it’s like; but in that case it is physical information and can be 
conveyed in lessons. 
 We might get a candidate for the subject matter of phenomenal information that is 
not just experience renamed, but is still tendentious. For instance, we might be told 
that phenomenal information concerns the intrinsic character of experience. A friend 
of phenomenal information might indeed believe that it reveals certain special, non-
physical intrinsic properties of experience. He might even believe that it reveals the 
existence of some special non-physical thing or process, all of whose intrinsic 
properties are non-physical. But he is by no means alone in saying that experience 
has an intrinsic character. Plenty of us materialists say so too. We say that a certain 
color-experience is whatever state occupies a certain functional role. So if the 
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occupant of that role (universally, or in the case of humans, or in the case of certain 
humans) is a certain pattern of neural firing, then that pattern of firing is the 
experience (in the ease in question). Therefore the intrinsic character of the 
experience is the intrinsic character of the firing pattern. For instance, a frequency of 
firing is part of the intrinsic character of the experience. If we materialists are right 
about what experience is, then black-and-white Mary knows all about the intrinsic 
character of color-experience; whereas most people who know what color-
experience is like remain totally ignorant about its intrinsic character.7 
 To say that phenomenal information concerns “qualia” would be tendentious in 
much the same way. For how was this notion introduced? Often thus. We are told to 
imagine someone who, when he sees red things, has just the sort of experiences that 
we have when we see green things, and vice versa; and we are told to call this a case 
of “inverted qualia”. And then we are told to imagine someone queerer still, who 
sees red and responds to it appropriately, and indeed has entirely the same 
functional organization of inner states as we do and yet has no experiences at all; 
and we are told to call this a case of “absent qualia”. Now a friend of phenomenal 
information might well think that these deficiencies have something to do with the 
non-physical subject matter of phenomenal information. But others can understand 
them otherwise. Some materialists will reject the cases outright, but others, and I for 
one, will make sense of them as best we can. Maybe the point is that the states that 
occupy the roles of experiences, and therefore are the experiences, in normal people 
are inverted or absent in victims of inverted or absent qualia. (This presupposes, 
what might be false, that most people are enough alike). Experience of red – the state 
that occupies that role in normal people – occurs also in the victim of “inverted 
qualia,” but in him it occupies the role of experience of green; whereas the state that 
occupies in him the role of experience of red is the state that occupies in normal 
people the role of experience of green. Experience of red and of green – that is, the 
occupants of those roles for normal people – do not occur at all in the victim of 
“absent qualia”; the occupants of those roles for him are states that don’t occur at all 
in the normal. Thus we make good sense of inverted and absent qualia; but in such a 
way that “qualia” is just the word for role-occupying states taken per se rather than 
qua occupants of roles. Qualia, so understood, could not be the subject matter of 
phenomenal information. Mary knows all about them. We who have them mostly 
don’t.8 
 It is best to rest content with an unhelpful name and a via negativa. Stipulate that 
“the phenomenal aspect of the world” is to name whatever is the subject matter of 
phenomenal information, if there is any such thing; the phenomenal aspect, if such 
there be, is that which we can become informed about by having new experiences 
but never by taking lessons. Having said this, it will be safe to say that information 
about the phenomenal aspect of the world can only be phenomenal information. But 
all we really know, after thus closing the circle, is that phenomenal information is 
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supposed to reveal the presence of some sort of non-physical things or processes 
within experience, or else it is supposed to reveal that certain physical things or 
processes within experience have some sort of non- physical properties. 
 
The Knowledge Argument 
 
If we invoke the Hypothesis of Phenomenal Information to explain why no amount 
of physical information suffices to teach us what a new experience is like, then we 
have a powerful argument to refute any materialist theory of the mind. Frank 
Jackson (see note 2) calls it the “Knowledge Argument." Arguments against one 
materialist theory or another are never very conclusive. It is always possible to 
adjust the details. But the Knowledge Argument, if it worked, would directly refute 
the bare minimum that is common to all materialist theories. 
 It goes as follows. First in a simplified form; afterward we’ll do it properly. 
Minimal Materialism is a supervenience thesis: no difference without physical 
difference. That is: any two possibilities that are just alike physically are just alike 
simpliciter. If two possibilities are just alike physically, then no physical information 
can eliminate one but not both of them. If two possibilities are just alike simpliciter (if 
that is possible) then no information whatsoever can eliminate one but not both of 
them. So if there is a kind of information – namely, phenomenal information – that 
can eliminate possibilities that any amount of physical information leaves open, then 
there must be possibilities that are just alike physically, but not just alike simpliciter. 
That is just what minimal Materialism denies. 
 (Analogy. If two possible locations in our region agree in their x-coordinate, then 
no amount of x-information can eliminate one but not both. If, per impossibile, two 
possible locations agreed in all their coordinates, then no information whatsoever 
could eliminate one but not both. So if there is a kind of information – namely, γ-
information – that can eliminate locations that any amount of x-information leaves 
open, then there must be locations in the region that agree in their x-coordinate but 
not in all their coordinates.) 
 Now to remove the simplification. What we saw so far was the Knowledge 
Argument against Materialism taken as a necessary truth, applying unrestrictedly to 
all possible worlds. But we materialists usually think that Materialism is a 
contingent truth. We grant that there are spooky possible worlds where Materialism 
is false, but we insist that our actual world isn’t one of them. If so, then there might 
after all be two possibilities that are alike physically but not alike simpliciter, but one 
or both of the two would have to be possibilities where Materialism was false. 
Spooky worlds could differ with respect to their spooks without differing physically. 
Our minimal Materialism must be a restricted supervenience thesis: within a certain 
class of worlds, which includes our actual world, there is no difference without 
physical difference. Within that class, any two possibilities just alike physically are 
just alike simpliciter. But what delineates the relevant class? (It is trivial that our 
world belongs to some class wherein there is no difference without physical 
difference. That will be so however spooky our world may be. The unit class of our 
world is one such class, for instance. And so is any class that contains our world, and 
contains no two physical duplicates.) I think the relevant class should consist of the 
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worlds that have nothing wholly alien to this world. The inhabitants of such a non-
alien world could be made from the inhabitants of ours, so to speak, by a process of 
division and recombination. That will make no wholly different kinds of things, and 
no wholly different fundamental properties of things.9 Our restricted materialist 
supervenience thesis should go as follows: throughout the non-alien worlds, there is 
no difference without physical difference. 
 If the Hypothesis of Phenomenal Information be granted, then the Knowledge 
Argument refutes this restricted supervenience nearly as decisively as it refutes the 
unrestricted version. Consider a possibility that is eliminated by phenomenal 
information, but not by any amount of physical information. There are two cases. 
Maybe this possibility has nothing that is alien to our world. In that case the 
argument goes as before: actuality and the eliminated possibility are just alike 
physically, they are not just alike simpliciter, furthermore, both of them fall within 
the restriction to non-alien worlds, so we have a counterexample even to restricted 
supervenience. Or maybe instead the eliminated possibility does have something X 
which is alien to this world – an alien kind of thing, or maybe an alien fundamental 
property of non-alien things. Then the phenomenal information gained by having a 
new experience has revealed something negative: at least in part, it is the 
information that X is not present. How can that be? If there is such a thing as 
phenomenal information, presumably what it reveals is positive: the presence of 
something hitherto unknown. Not, of course, something alien from actuality itself; 
but something alien from actuality as it is inadequately represented by the 
inexperienced and by the materialists. If Mary learns something when she finds out 
what it’s like to see the colors, presumably she learns that there’s more to the world 
than she knew before – not less. it’s easy to think that phenomenal information might 
eliminate possibilities that are impoverished by comparison with actuality, but that 
would make a counterexample to the restricted supervenience thesis. To eliminate 
possibilities without making a counterexample, phenomenal information would 
have to eliminate possibilities less impoverished than actuality. And how can 
phenomenal information do that? Compare ordinary perceptual information. Maybe 
Jean-Paul can just see that Pierre is absent from the café, at least if it’s a small café. 
But how can he just see that Pierre is absent from Paris, let alone from the whole of 
actuality? 
 (Is there a third case? What if the eliminated possibility is in one respect richer 
than actuality, in another respect poorer? Suppose the eliminated possibility has X, 
which is alien from actuality, but also it lacks Y. Then phenomenal information 
might eliminate it by revealing the actual presence of Y, without having to reveal the 
actual absence of X – But then I say there ought to be a third possibility, one with 
neither X nor Y, poorer and in no respect richer than actuality, and again without 
any physical difference from actuality. For why should taking away X automatically 
restore Y? Why can’t they vary independently?10 But this third possibility differs 
                                                
9 See my “New work for a theory of universals,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (1983), pp. 34–77, 
especially pp. 361–4. For a different view about how to state minimal Materialism, see Terence 
Horgan, “Supervenience and microphysics," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63 (1982), pp. 29–43. 
10 On recombination of possibilities, see my On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), pp. 
87–92. The present argument may call for a principle that also allows recombination of properties; 1 
  11 
simpliciter from actuality without differing physically. Further, it has nothing alien 
from actuality. So we regain a counterexample to the restricted supervenience 
thesis.) 
 The Knowledge Argument works. There is no way to grant the Hypothesis of 
Phenomenal Information and still uphold Materialism. Therefore I deny the 
Hypothesis. I cannot refute it outright. But later I shall argue, first, that it is more 
peculiar, and therefore less tempting, that it may at first seem; and, second, that we 
are not forced to accept it, since an alternative hypothesis does justice to the way 
experience best teaches us what it’s like. 
 
Three more ways to miss the point 
 
The Hypothesis of Phenomenal Information characterizes information in terms of 
eliminated possibilities. But there are other conceptions of “information.” Therefore 
the Hypothesis has look-alikes: hypotheses which say that experience produces 
“information” which could not be gained otherwise, but do not characterize this 
“information” in terms of eliminated possibilities. These look-alikes do not work as 
premises for the Knowledge Argument. They do not say that phenomenal 
information eliminates possibilities that differ, but do not differ physically, from 
uneliminated possibilities. The look-alike hypotheses of phenomenal “information” 
are consistent with Materialism, and may very well be true. But they don’t make the 
Knowledge Argument go away. Whatever harmless look-alikes may or may not be 
true, and whatever conception may or may not deserve the name “information,” the 
only way to save Materialism is fix our attention squarely on the genuine Hypothesis 
of Phenomenal Information, and deny it. To avert our eyes, and attend to something 
else, is no substitute for that denial. 
 Might a look-alike help at least to this extent: by giving us something true that 
well might have been confused with the genuine Hypothesis, thereby explaining 
how we might have believed the Hypothesis although it was false? I think not. Each 
of the look-alikes turns out to imply not only that experience can give us 
“information” that no amount of lessons can give, but also that lessons in Russian 
can give us “information” that no amount of lessons in English can give (and vice 
versa). I doubt that any friend of phenomenal information ever thought that the 
special role of experience in teaching what it’s like was on a par with the special role 
of Russian! I will have to say before I’m done that phenomenal information is an 
illusion, but I think I must look elsewhere for a credible hypothesis about what sort 
of illusion it might be. 
 
The Fourth Way. If a hidden camera takes photographs of a room, the film ends up 
bearing traces of what went on in the room. The traces are distinctive: that is, the 
details of the traces depend on the details of what went on, and if what went on had 
been different in any of many ways, the traces would have been correspondingly 
different. So we can say that the traces bear information, and that he who has the 
                                                                                                                                                  
now think that would not necessarily require treating properties as non-spatiotemporal parts of their 
instances. On recombination of properties, see also D. M. Armstrong, A Combinatorial Theory of 
Possibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1989).  
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film has the information. That might be said because the traces, plus the way they 
depend on what went on, suffice to eliminate possibilities; but instead we might say 
“information” and just mean “distinctive traces.” If so, it’s certainly true that new 
experience imparts information” unlike any that can be gained from lessons. 
Experience and lessons leave different kinds of traces. That is so whether or not the 
experience eliminates possibilities that the lessons leave open. It is equally true, of 
course, that lessons in Russian leave traces unlike any that are left by lessons in 
English, regardless of whether the lessons cover the same ground and eliminate the 
same possibilities. 
 
The Fifth Way. When we speak of transmission of “information,” we often mean 
transmission of text. Repositories of “information,” such as libraries, are storehouses 
of text. Whether the text is empty verbiage or highly informative is beside the point. 
Maybe we too contain information by being storehouses of text. Maybe there is a 
language of thought, and maybe the way we believe things is to store sentences of 
this language in some special way, or in some special part of our brains. In that case, 
we could say that storing away a new sentence was storing away a new piece of 
“information,” whether or not that new piece eliminated any possibilities not 
already eliminated by the sentences stored previously. Maybe, also, the language of 
thought is not fixed once and for all, but can gain new words. Maybe, for instance, it 
borrows words from public language. And maybe, when one has a new experience, 
that causes one’s language of thought to gain a new word which denotes that 
experience – a word which could not have been added to the language by any other 
means. If all this is so, then when Mary sees colors, her language of thought gains 
new words, allowing her to store away new sentences and thereby gain 
“information.” All this about the language of thought, the storing of sentences, and 
the gaining of words is speculation. But it is plausible speculation, even if no longer 
the only game in town. If it is all true, then we have another look-alike hypothesis of 
phenomenal “information.” When Mary gains new words and stores new sentences, 
that is “information” that she never had before, regardless of whether it eliminates 
any possibilities that she had not eliminated already. 
 But again, the special role of experience turns out to be on a par with the special 
role of Russian. If the language of thought picks up new words by borrowing from 
public language, then lessons in Russian add new words, and result in the storing of 
new sentences, and thereby impart “information” that never could have been had 
from lessons in English. (You might say that the new Russian words are mere 
synonyms of old words, or at least old phrases, that were there already; and 
synonyms don’t count. But no reason has been given why the new inner words 
created by experience may not also be synonyms of old phrases, perhaps of long 
descriptions in the language of neurophysiology.) 
 
The Sixth Way. A philosopher who is skeptical about possibility, as so many are, may 
wish to replace possibilities themselves with linguistic ersatz possibilities: maximal 
consistent sets of sentences. And he may be content to take “consistent” in a 
narrowly logical sense, so that a set with “Fred is married” and “Fred is a bachelor” 
may count as consistent, and only an overt contradiction like “Fred is married” and 
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“Fred is not married” will be ruled out.11 The ersatz possibilities might also be taken 
as sets of sentences of the language of thought, if the philosopher believes in it. Then 
if someone’s language of thought gains new words, whether as a result of new 
experience or as a result of being taught in Russian, the ersatz possibilities become 
richer and more numerous. The sets of sentences that were maximal before are no 
longer maximal after new words are added. So when Mary sees colors and her 
language of thought gains new words, there are new ersatz possibilities; and she can 
straightway eliminate some of them. Suppose she knows beforehand that she is 
about to see green, and that the experience of seeing green is associated with neural 
firing pattern F. So when she sees green and gains the new word G for her 
experience, then straightway there are new, enriched ersatz possibilities with 
sentences saying that she has G without F, and straightway she knows enough to 
eliminate these ersatz possibilities. (Even if she does not know beforehand what she 
is about to see, straightway she can eliminate at least those of her new-found ersatz 
possibilities with sentences denying that she then has G.) Just as we can characterize 
information in terms of elimination of possibilities, so we can characterize ersatz 
“information” in terms of elimination of ersatz “possibilities.” So here we have the 
closest look-alike hypothesis of all, provided that language-of-thoughtism is true. 
But we still do not have the genuine Hypothesis of Phenomenal Information, since 
the eliminated ersatz possibility of G without F may not have been a genuine 
possibility at all. It may have been like the ersatz possibility of married bachelors. 
 
Curiouser and curiouser 
 
The Hypothesis of Phenomenal Information is more peculiar than it may at first 
seem. For one thing, because it is opposed to more than just Materialism. Some of 
you may have welcomed the Knowledge Argument because you thought all along 
that physical information was inadequate to explain the phenomena of mind. You 
may have been convinced all along that the mind could do things that no physical 
system could do: bend spoons, invent new jokes, demonstrate the consistency of 
arithmetic, reduce the wave packet, or what have you. You may have been 
convinced that the full causal story of how the deeds of mind are accomplished 
involves the causal interactions not only of material bodies but also of astral bodies; 
not only the vibrations of the electromagnetic field but also the good or bad vibes of 
the psionic field; not only protoplasm but ectoplasm. I doubt it, but never mind. It’s 
irrelevant to our topic. The Knowledge Argument is targeted against you no less 
than it is against Materialism itself. 
 Let parapsychology be the science of all the non-physical things, properties, causal 
processes, laws of nature, and so forth that may be required to explain the things we 
do. Let us suppose that we learn ever so much parapsychology. It will make no 
difference. Black-and-white Mary may study all the parapsychology as well as all 
the psychophysics of color vision, but she still won’t know what it’s like. Lessons on 
the aura of Vegemite will do no more for us than lessons on its chemical 
composition. And so it goes. Our intuitive starting point wasn’t just that physics 
                                                
11 See On the Plurality of Worlds, pp. 142–65, on linguistic ersatz possibilities. 
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lessons couldn’t help the inexperienced to know what it’s like. It was that lessons 
couldn’t help. If there is such a thing as phenomenal information, it isn’t just 
independent of physical information. It’s independent of every sort of information 
that could be served up in lessons for the inexperienced. For it is supposed to 
eliminate possibilities that any amount of lessons leave open. Therefore phenomenal 
information is not just parapsychological information, if such there be. It‘s 
something very much stranger. 
 The genuine Hypothesis of Phenomenal Information, as distinguished from its 
look-alikes, treats information in terms of the elimination of possibilities. When we 
lack information, several alternative possibilities are open, when we get the 
information some of the alternatives are excluded. But a second peculiar thing about 
phenomenal information is that it resists this treatment. (So does logical or 
mathematical “information.” However, phenomenal information cannot be logical or 
mathematical, because lessons in logic and mathematics no more teach us what a 
new experience is like than lessons in physics or parapsychology do.) When 
someone doesn’t know what it’s like to have an experience, where are the alternative 
open possibilities? I cannot present to myself in thought a range of alternative 
possibilities about what it might be like to taste Vegemite. That is because I cannot 
imagine either what it is like to taste Vegemite, or any alternative way that it might 
be like but in fact isn’t. (I could perfectly well imagine that Vegemite tastes just like 
peanut butter, or something else familiar to me, but let’s suppose I’ve been told 
authoritatively that this isn’t so.) I can’t even pose the question that phenomenal 
information is supposed to answer: is it this way or that? It seems that the alternative 
possibilities must be unthinkable beforehand; and afterward too, except for the one 
that turns out to be actualized. I don’t say there’s anything altogether impossible 
about a range of unthinkable alternatives; only something peculiar. But it’s peculiar 
enough to suggest that we may somehow have gone astray. 
 
From phenomenal to epiphenomenal 
 
A third peculiar thing about phenomenal information is that it is strangely isolated 
from all other sorts of information; and this is so regardless of whether the mind 
works on physical or parapsychological principles. The phenomenal aspect of the 
world has nothing to do with explaining why people seemingly talk about the 
phenomenal aspect of the world. For instance, it plays no part in explaining the 
movements of the pens of philosophers writing treatises about phenomenal 
information and the way experience has provided them with it. 
 When Mary gets out of her black-and-white cell, her jaw drops. She says “At last! 
So this is what it’s like to see colors!” Afterward she does things she couldn’t do 
before, such as recognizing a new sample of the first color she ever saw. She may 
also do other things she didn’t do before: unfortunate things, like writing about 
phenomenal information and the poverty of Materialism. One might think she said 
what she said and did what she did because she came to know what it’s like to see 
colors. Not so, if the Hypothesis of Phenomenal Information is right. For suppose the 
phenomenal aspect of the world had been otherwise, so that she gained different 
phenomenal information. Or suppose the phenomenal aspect of the world had been 
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absent altogether, as we materialists think it is. Would that have made the slightest 
difference to what she did or said then or later? I think not. Making a difference to 
what she does or says means, at least in part, making a difference to the motions of 
the particles of which she is composed. (Or better: making a difference to the 
spatiotemporal shape of the wave-function of those particles. But let that pass.) For 
how could she do or say anything different, if none of her particles moved any 
differently? But if something non-physical sometimes makes a difference to the 
motions of physical particles, then physics as we know it is wrong. Not just silent, 
not just incomplete – wrong. Either the particles are caused to change their motion 
without benefit of any force, or else there is some extra force that works very 
differently from the usual four. To believe in the phenomenal aspect of the world, 
but deny that it is epiphenomenal, is to bet against the truth of physics. Given the 
success of physics hitherto, and even with due allowance for the foundational 
ailments of quantum mechanics, such betting is rash! A friend of the phenomenal 
aspect would be safer to join Jackson in defense of epiphenomenal qualia. 
 But there is more to the case than just an empirical bet in favor of physics. 
Suppose there is a phenomenal aspect of the world, and suppose it does make some 
difference to the motions of Mary’s jaw or the noises out of her mouth. Then we can 
describe the phenomenal aspect, if we know enough, in terms of its physical effects. 
It is that on which physical phenomena depend in such-and-such way. This 
descriptive handle will enable us to give lessons on it to the inexperienced. But in so 
far as we can give lessons on it, what we have is just parapsychology. That whereof 
we cannot learn except by having the experience still eludes us. I do not argue that 
everything about the alleged distinctive subject matter of phenomenal information 
must be epiphenomenal. Part of it may be parapsychological instead. But I insist that 
some aspect of it must be epiphenomenal.. 
 Suppose that the Hypothesis of Phenomenal Information is true and suppose that 
V1 and V2 are all of the maximally specific phenomenal possibilities concerning what 
it’s like to taste Vegemite; anyone who tastes Vegemite will find out which one 
obtains, and no one else can. And suppose that P1 and P2 are all the maximally 
specific physical possibilities. (Of course we really need far more than two Ps, and 
maybe a friend of phenomenal information would want more than two Vs, but 
absurdly small numbers will do for an example.) Then we have four alternative 
hypotheses about the causal independence or dependence of the Ps on the Vs. Each 
one can be expressed as a pair of counterfactual conditionals. Two hypotheses are 
patterns of dependence. 
 
K1: if V1 then P1, if V2 then P2 
K2: if V1 then P2, if V2 then P1 
 
The other two are patterns of independence. 
 
K3: if V1 then P1, if V2 then P1 
K4: if V1 then P2, if V2 then P2 
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These dependency hypotheses are, I take it, contingent propositions. They are made 
true, if they are, by some contingent feature of the world, though it’s indeed a vexed 
question what sort of feature it is.12 Now we have eight joint possibilities. 
 
K1V1P1 K3V1P1 K3V2P1 K2V2P1 
K2V1P2 K4V1P2 K4V2P2 K1V2P2 
 
Between the four on the top row and the four on the bottom row, there is the 
physical difference between P1 and P2. Between the four on the left and the four on 
the right, there is the phenomenal difference between V1, and V2. And between the 
four on the edges and the four in the middle there is a parapsychological difference. 
It is the difference between dependence and independence of the physical on the 
phenomenal; between efficacy and epiphenomenalism, so far as this one example is 
concerned. There’s nothing ineffable about that. Whether or not you’ve tasted 
Vegemite, and whether or not you can conceive of the alleged difference between V1 
and V2, you can still be told whether the physical difference between P1 and P2 does 
or doesn’t depend on some part of the phenomenal aspect of the world. 
 Lessons can teach the inexperienced which parapsychological possibility obtains, 
dependence or independence. Let it be dependence: we have either K1 or K2. For if 
we had independence, then already we would have found our epiphenomenal 
difference: namely, the difference between V1 and V2. And lessons can teach the 
inexperienced which of the two physical possibilities obtains. Without loss of 
generality let it be P1. Now two of our original eight joint possibilities remain open: 
K1V1P1 and K2V2P1. The difference between those is not at all physical, and not at all 
parapsychological: it’s P1, and it’s dependence, in both cases. The difference is 
entirely phenomenal. And also it is entirely epiphenomenal. Nothing physical, and 
nothing parapsychological, depends on the difference between K1V1P1 and K2V2P1. 
We have the same sort of pattern of dependence either way; it’s just that the 
phenomenal possibilities have been swapped. Whether it’s independence or whether 
it’s dependence, therefore, we have found an epiphenomenal part of the 
phenomenal aspect of the world. It is the residue left behind when we remove the 
parapsychological part. 
 Suppose that someday I taste Vegemite, and hold forth about how I know at last 
what it’s like. The sound of my holding forth is a physical effect, part of the realized 
physical possibility P1. This physical effect is exactly the same whether it’s part of 
the joint possibility K1V1P1, or part of its alternative K2V2P1. It may be caused by V1 
in accordance with K1, or it may instead be caused by V2 in accordance with K2, but 
it’s the same either way. So it does not occur because we have K1V1 rather than 
K2V2, or vice versa. The alleged difference between these two possibilities does 
nothing to explain the alleged physical manifestation of my finding out which one of 
them is realized. It is in that way that the difference is epiphenomenal. That makes it 
very queer, and repugnant to good sense. 
 
                                                
12 On dependency hypotheses, see my “Causal decision theory,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59 
(1981), pp. 5–30, reprinted in my Philosophical Papers, vol. II (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1986). 
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The Ability Hypothesis 
 
So the Hypothesis of Phenomenal Information turns out to be very peculiar indeed. 
It would be nice, and not only for materialists, if we could reject it. For materialists, it 
is essential to reject it. And we can. There is an alternative hypothesis about what it 
is to learn what an experience is like: the Ability Hypothesis. Laurence Nemirow 
summarizes it thus: 
 
some modes of understanding consist, not in the grasping of facts, but in the acquisition of abilities. . . 
. As for understanding an experience, we may construe that as an ability to place oneself, at will, in a 
state representative of the experience. I understand the experience of seeing red if I can at will 
visualize red. Now it is perfectly clear why there must be a special connection between the ability to 
place oneself in a state representative of a given experience and the point of view of experiencer: 
exercising the ability just is what we call “adopting the point of view of experiencer.” . . . We can, 
then, come to terms with the subjectivity of our understanding of experience without positing 
subjective facts as the objects of our understanding. This account explains, incidentally, the linguistic 
incommunicability of our subjective understanding of experience (a phenomenon which might seem 
to support the hypothesis of subjective facts). The latter is explained as a special case of the linguistic 
incommunicability of abilities to place oneself at will in a given state, such as the state of having 
lowered blood pressure, and the state of having wiggling ears.13 
 
If you have a new experience, you gain abilities to remember and to imagine. After 
you taste Vegemite, and you learn what it’s like, you can afterward remember the 
experience you had. By remembering how it once was, you can afterward imagine 
such an experience. Indeed, even if you eventually forget the occasion itself, you will 
very likely retain your ability to imagine such an experience. 
 Further, you gain an ability to recognize the same experience if it comes again. If 
you taste Vegemite on another day, you will probably know that you have met the 
taste once before. And if, while tasting Vegemite, you know that it is Vegemite you 
are tasting, then you will be able to put the name to the experience if you have it 
again. Or if you are told nothing at the time, but later you somehow know that it is 
Vegemite that you are then remembering or imagining tasting, again you can put the 
name to the experience, or to the memory, or to the experience of imagining, if it 
comes again. Here, the ability you gain is an ability to gain information if given other 
information. Nevertheless, the information gained is not phenomenal, and the ability 
to gain information is not the same thing as information itself. 
                                                
13 Laurence Nemirow, review of Nagel’s Mortal Questions, Philosophical Review 89 (1980), pp. 475–6. 
For a fuller statement, see Nemirow, “Physicalism and the cognitive role of acquaintance,“ in William 
G. Lycan (ed.), Mind and Cognition: A Reader (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1990); and 
Functionalism and the Subjective Quality of Experience (doctoral dissertation, Stanford, 1979). See also 
Michael Tye, “The subjective qualities of experience,” Mind 95 (1986), pp. 1–17. 
 I should record a disagreement with Nemirow on one very small point. We agree that the phrase 
“what experience E is like” does not denote some “subjective quality" of E, something which 
supposedly would be part of the subject matter of the phenomenal information gained by having E. 
But whereas I have taken the phrase to denote E itself, Nemirow takes it to be a syncategorematic part 
of the expression “know what experience E is like". See “Physicalism and the cognitive role of 
acquaintance“ section III. 
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 Earlier, I mentioned “knowing what an experience is like under a description.” 
Now I can say that what I meant by this was having the ability to remember or 
imagine an experience while also knowing the egocentric proposition that what one 
is then imagining is the experience of such-and-such description. One might well 
know what an experience is like under one description, but not under another. One 
might even know what some experience is like, but not under any description 
whatever – unless it be some rather trivial description like “that queer taste that I‘m 
imagining right now.” That is what would happen if you slipped a dab of Vegemite 
into my food without telling me what it was: afterward, I would know what it was 
like to taste Vegemite, but not under that description, and not under any other non-
trivial description. It might be suggested that “knowing what it’s like to taste 
Vegemite” really means what I’d call “knowing what it’s like to taste Vegemite 
under the description ‘tasting Vegemite’”; and if so, knowing what it’s like would 
involve both ability and information. I disagree. For surely it would make sense to 
say: “I know this experience well, I’ve long known what it’s like, but only today 
have I found out that it’s the experience of tasting Vegemite.” But this verbal 
question is unimportant. For the information involved in knowing what it’s like 
under a description, and allegedly involved in knowing what it’s like, is anyhow not 
the queer phenomenal information that needs rejecting. 
 (Is there a problem here for the friend of phenomenal information? Suppose he 
says that knowing what it’s like to taste Vegemite means knowing that the taste of 
Vegemite has a certain “phenomenal character.” This requires putting the name to 
the taste, so clearly it corresponds to our notion of knowing what it’s like to taste 
Vegemite under the description “tasting Vegemite.” But we also have our notion of 
knowing what it’s like simpliciter, and what can he offer that corresponds to that? 
Perhaps he should answer by appeal to a trivial description, as follows: knowing 
what it’s like simpliciter means knowing what it’s like under the trivial description 
“taste I’m imagining now,” and that means knowing that the taste one is imagining 
now has a certain phenomenal character.) 
 As well as gaining the ability to remember and imagine the experience you had, 
you also gain the ability to imagine related experiences that you never had. After 
tasting Vegemite, you might for instance become able to imagine tasting Vegemite 
ice cream. By performing imaginative experiments, you can predict with some 
confidence what you would do in circumstances that have never arisen – whether 
you'd ask for a second helping of Vegemite ice cream, for example. 
 These abilities to remember and imagine and recognize are abilities you cannot 
gain (unless by super-neurosurgery, or by magic) except by tasting Vegemite and 
learning what it’s like. You can‘t get them by taking lessons on the physics or the 
parapsychology of the experience, or even by taking comprehensive lessons that 
cover the whole of physics and parapsychology. The Ability Hypothesis says that 
knowing what an experience is like just is the possession of these abilities to 
remember, imagine, and recognize. It isn’t the possession of any kind of information, 
ordinary or peculiar. It isn’t knowing that certain possibilities aren’t actualized. It 
isn’t knowing-that. It’s knowing-how. Therefore it should be no surprise that lessons 
won’t teach you what an experience is like. Lessons impart information; ability is 
something else. Knowledge-that does not automatically provide know-how. 
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 There are parallel cases. Some know how to wiggle their ears; others don’t. If you 
can’t do it, no amount of information will help. Some know how to eat with 
chopsticks, others don’t. Information will help up to a point – for instance, if your 
trouble is that you hold one chopstick in each hand – but no amount of information, 
by itself, will bring you to a very high level of know-how. Some know how to 
recognize a C-38 locomotive by sight, others don’t. If you don’t, it won’t much help 
if you memorize a detailed geometrical description of its shape, even though that 
does all the eliminating of possibilities that there is to be done. (Conversely, 
knowing the shape by sight doesn’t enable you to write down the geometrical 
description.) Information very often contributes to know-how, but often it doesn’t 
contribute enough. That’s why music students have to practice. 
 Know-how is ability. But of course some aspects of ability are in no sense 
knowledge: strength, sufficient funds. Other aspects of ability are, purely and 
simply, a matter of information. If you want to know how to open the combination 
lock on the bank vault, information is all you need. It remains that there are aspects 
of ability that do not consist simply of possession of information, and that we do call 
knowledge. The Ability Hypothesis holds that knowing what an experience is like is 
that sort of knowledge. 
 If the Ability Hypothesis is the correct analysis of knowing what an experience is 
like, then phenomenal information is an illusion. We ought to explain that illusion. It 
would be feeble, I think, just to say that we’re fooled by the ambiguity of the word 
“know”: we confuse ability with information because we confuse knowledge in the 
sense of knowing-how with knowledge in the sense of knowing- that. There may be 
two senses of the word “know,” but they are well and truly entangled. They mark 
the two pure endpoints of a range of mixed cases. The usual thing is that we gain 
information and ability together. If so, it should be no surprise if we apply to pure 
cases of gaining ability, or to pure cases of gaining information, the same word 
“know” that we apply to all the mixed cases. 
 Along with information and ability, acquaintance is a third element of the 
mixture. If Lloyd George died too soon, there’s a sense in which Father never can 
know him. Information won't do it, even if Father is a most thorough biographer and 
the archives are very complete. (And the trouble isn’t that there’s some very special 
information about someone that you can only get by being in his presence.) Know-
how won’t do it either, no matter how good Father may be at imagining Lloyd 
George, seemingly remembering him, and recognizing him. (Father may be able to 
recognize Lloyd George even if there’s no longer any Lloyd George to recognize – if 
per impossibile he did turn up, Father could tell it was him.) Again, what we have is 
not just a third separate sense of “know.” Meeting someone, gaining a lot of 
information about him that would be hard to gain otherwise, and gaining abilities 
regarding him usually go together. The pure cases are exceptions. 
 A friend of phenomenal information will agree, of course, that when we learn 
what an experience is like, we gain abilities to remember, imagine, and recognize. 
But he will say that it is because we gain phenomenal information that we gain the 
abilities. He might even say the same about other cases of gaining know-how: you 
can recognize the C-38 when you have phenomenal information about what it’s like 
to see that shape, you can eat with chopsticks or wiggle your ears when you gain 
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phenomenal information about the experience of doing so, and so on. What should 
friends of the Ability Hypothesis make of this? Is he offering a conjecture, which we 
must reject, about the causal origin of abilities? l think not. He thinks, as we do, that 
experiences leave distinctive traces in people, and that these traces enable us to do 
things. Likewise being taught to recognize a C-38 or to eat with chopsticks, or 
whatever happens on first wiggling the ears, leave traces that enable us to do things 
afterward. That much is common ground. He also interprets these enabling traces as 
representations that bear information about their causes. (If the same traces had been 
caused in some deviant way they might perhaps have carried misinformation.) We 
might even be able to accept that too. The time for us to quarrel comes only when he 
says that these traces represent special phenomenal facts, facts which cannot be 
represented in any other way, and therefore which cannot be taught in physics 
lessons or even in parapsychology lessons. That is the part, and the only part, which 
we must reject. But that is no part of his psychological story about how we gain 
abilities. It is just a gratuitous metaphysical gloss on that story. 
 We say that learning what an experience is like means gaining certain abilities. If 
the causal basis for those abilities turns out also to be a special kind of representation 
of some sort of information, so be it. We need only deny that it represents a special 
kind of information about a special subject matter. Apart from that it’s up for grabs 
what, if anything, it may represent. The details of stimuli: the chemical composition 
of Vegemite, reflectances of surfaces, the motions of well-handled chopsticks or of 
ears? The details of inner states produced by those stimuli: patterns of firings of 
nerves? We could agree to either, so long as we did not confuse ‘having information’ 
represented in this special way with having the same information in the form of 
knowledge or belief. Or we could disagree. Treating the ability-conferring trace as a 
representation is optional. What’s essential is that when we learn what an experience 
is like by having it, we gain abilities to remember, imagine, and recognize. 
